Thursday, December 5, 2019
Privatization In Russia Essay Paper For some, the privatization of Russian industry has been one of the great success stories of Russias painful economic transition: quick, firm and radical action was taken to shift the great bulk of Russian industry out of state hands, thereby laying the basis for a radical restructuring of enterprises and improvements in their performance. Others see privatization as a best a failure, at worst a catastrophe. Not surprisingly those opposed to the market and economic reform as a whole share this view. But many commentators who see themselves as supporters of reform find plenty in Russian privatization to criticize: the process led to the transfer of ownership to inappropriate people and as a consequence no beneficial restructuring of enterprises or the economy can be expected. While this paper will attempt to cover the three key facets of privatization: that enterprises be transferred to private ownership; that the new owners be able de jure and de facto to exercise ownership rights; and, finally and ultimately most importantly, that the new owners exercise their ownership rights in such a way as to bring about improvements in enterprise performance. The key issues to be surveyed, therefore, are: who as a result of privatization obtained ownership of Russian industrial assets, and are they appropriate owners; can new owners, particularly if they are appropriate owners, exercise their owne rship rights; and has privatization led to improvements in enterprise performance? The paper will deal with privatization only within the industrial sector; thereby ignoring the highly controversial privatizations of the last twelve months or so in the energy and utility sectors. Who are the new owners?Global data showing about 70% of GNP being produced in the private sector reflects the high levels of privatization of industrial enterprises, with the great bulk of enterprises having been privatized by mid-1994. However privatization does not necessarily mean the complete removal of the state from an equity involvement in enterprises. State ownership. The state retains shareholdings in a significant number of privatized enterprises on the basis of government decrees declaring the strategic significance for national security of the enterprise. Shareholdings range from 20 to 51 per cent or a Golden Share (a single share giving veto rights over certain strategic issues of corporate development) retained by the state for up to three years. In late 1997 the state had shareholdings in 2900 enterprises. The shareholding consisted of a Golden Share in 1351 cases, of over 50% of shares in 128, of 25-50%, in 1037, of 20-25% in 228, and less than 20% in 303 of cases. By far the largest numbers of state holdings are in the energy sector (860). Not surprisingly the defense industry sector has a significant number (260). The rest are scattered across the economy. This is a not insignificant state equity interest in Russian industry. There appears to be no particular trend towards either the strengthening or weakening of the states holdings, primarily because there are very differing views within government over which direction any trend should take. There is a continuing dribble of disposals, but decrees extending the period for which the state can retain parcels of shares in particular enterprises are also not rare. The number of enterprises deemed to require a strategic state interest increased from the original 2700 set in the governments 1995 decree, to over 3200 in early 1997, but had declined to 2900 by the end of 1997. It seems likely that a rump state presence will remain for some time to come, but not at a level that represents the basis for a significant rolling back of privatization. Majority workforce shareholdings are seen as leading to two possible outcomes: collective ownership, in which the enterprise is owned and managed in a collective way by a workforce with common interests; or management ownership, in which management in various ways gains de facto if not de jure ownership rights over workforce shares and thereby gains effective ownership of the enterprise. Collective ownership derives either from a natural alliance between managers and rank-and-file employees, probably based on Soviet traditions of paternalism and the social contract, or from the need of managers to pander to workers who control a majority of voting rights at shareholder meetings. Although some observers might find a collective ownership outcome desirable, on the grounds that it provides for workplace democracy and high-incentive work habits, reform-oriented commentators generally find it a form of ownership likely to lead to the maintenance of excessively high levels of underemployed staff and an over concentration on consumption at the expense of investment. The management ownership outcome derives from the ability of management to totally dominate divided, demoralized or indifferent rank-and-file employees. The argument that they do so by bribing employees with promises of secure employment and the maintenance of social welfare provisions is essentially the same as that presented in the previous paragraph on collective ownership. Korean War Essay Thesis The Law clearly responds to most of the abuses of shareholders rights, which littered the initial years of post-communist corporate governance. A summary of the legislation, especially the clauses most related to the protection of shareholders rights follows. Some of the examples of management behavior outlined above make it clear how important the rules on notification of meetings and quorums are. Regulations on notification are contained in Article 52. It is not essential that shareholders be informed directly and personally of shareholders meeting, although if a simple advertisement is to suffice the publication in which it is to appear must be specified in the Articles of Association. For larger AOs at least 30 days notice must be given of a meeting, with the Law containing a considerable degree of specification of the information that must be included in the notification. The board of directors of an AO with over 1,000 shareholders must have at least seven members; nine members are required for AOs with over 10,000 shareholders. Members of the management committee must be in a minority on the board, and the general director cannot simultaneously chair the board (Art. 66). Although the Law makes no provisions for the representation of minority shareholders on boards of directors, the requirement that cumulative voting be used in elections to boards is presumably designed to provide some protection (Art.59). The Federal Commission on the Capital Market reports an increase in outsider representation on boards since the first half of 1994, but also those outsiders are still underrepresented. One would be unwise to underestimate the ingenuity of Russian managers in finding ways around the Law, or their willingness to simply disobey it.61 Nevertheless the most obvious sources of abuse of shareholders rights have been dealt with. The fact that the Law one passed after all by a communist-dominated parliament has a pro-shareholder orientation is in itself worthy of note. As Dmitrii Vasilev, the head of the Federal Commission on the Capital Market, put it after the passage of the Law: As a result, we can say most violations of shareholders rights are now illegal in RussiaConclusionI am prepared nevertheless to venture, albeit tentatively, that the score card is not obviously against privatization. The suggestion that the designers of privatization were somehow conned into handing ownership over to managers does not stand up. The indications are that they knew what they were doing and judged that outside owners would eventually assert themselves. Gradually they are doing so, and gradually they are improving their ability to exercise and enforce their ownership rights. Sometimes they are doing so in ways that are no less reprehensible than the methods of the manager-owners. There are also reasons to be concerned about the long-term consequences of the sort of bank-dominated and highly integrated ownership that many of the outsiders have brought. The best that can be said at this stage is that all modern economies have at their peak a corporate sector dominated by large integrated institutions. Clearly the private sector, and thereby privatization, has to bear some responsibility for an economy in which it has a 70% share but which is unable to provide in anything like adequate proportions growth or welfare. But in this there are other factors also at work. Indeed there are some small indications, at both macro- and micro-levels, of a positive correlation between private ownership and good performance. With time that correlation could well become stronger and more evident. Business
Thursday, November 28, 2019
An Exploration of Sallust's and Plutarch's View of the Moral Decline of the Roman Republic Jamie Neufeld ST# 864583 For: L. Foley Class. 111.3 (08) Though there are varied dates as to the time that the Roman Republic stood, it is agreed upon as lasting approximately 500 years. During the last century of its existence (133 BC -27 BC) there were the many violent years of The Civil Wars and much social strife. Though the end result of these final years of the res publica was the adoption of an Emperor and the birth of the Roman Empire, the focus of this paper will be the presentation of the nature of tensions at the end of the res publica using selections from Sallust and Plutarch as a basis. Sallust and Plutarch, while coming from different worlds and living different lives were very much alike in the thoughts that they presented in their writing on the fall of the Roman Republic. Sallust was an active individual in Roman politics during the Republic's decline. He was a tribune in 52 B C who was kicked out of the Senate amid allegations of immorality. In 49 BC Sallust was in command of one of Julius Caesar's legions and was elected to Praetor in 47 BC. Taking part in the African Campaign earned him the governorship of Numidia in. Upon his return to Rome in the early 40's BC however he was charged with extortion, only to be released by Caesar. At this point in his life he decided to become a writer of history and lived a quiet life doing that. Plutarch's life was very much different form Sallust's. Born in Chaeronea he remained there for much of his life. His last 30 years he spent as a Priest at Delphi. There he was a devout believer in the ancient pieties and a profound student of its antiquities. The only involvement in politics at the time were stories that he was a man of influence and rumors of a governmental office being bestowed upon him by both Hadrian and Trajan. Despite the differences in their lives and backgrounds, their surviving literature has a basi c underlying similarity; that being morality. To be more specific, the lack of morality on the part of the rulers of Rome during the last century of the Republic. In the following essay I will show examples of how Sallust and Plutarch point out again and again the lack of morality in the characters about whom they write in reference to the decline of the Roman Republic. Sallust begins his Bellum Catalinae by telling us how the Roman Republic was built. He shows us that the people put aside their differences and kept their common goal, peace, in mind. According to the version I have heard, in the beginning the Trojans who were wandering in exile without a fixed home under the leadership of Aeneas founded and controlled the city of Rome as a free and independent Republic along with the indigenous people, A primitive tribe of men without laws or organized government. It is remarkable how easily these two peoples united after they had been gathered together in one community in the light of their differences in race and in language and the disparity in the way in which each of them lived: in a short time a diverse and nomadic mass of people was transformed by harmony into a Republic. Later after the Republic had grown in population, institutions and territory and seemed to be sufficient in prosperity and strength then, as happens in most human affairs, envy grew out of success.1 Clearly Sallust is setting up some contrast from what was good and right to what will become the Republic's demise. At the end of the passage above Sallust points out "as happens in most human affairs, envy grew out of success." This idea is presented again later when Sallust writes: "... the rule of the Kings of which the original purpose had to protect the liberty and to strengthen the Republic turned into pride and tyranny ..."2 He is reiterating the fact that the agenda of the Kings had changed over time from one that was morally good
Monday, November 25, 2019
Review of Wigan Pier essays This book was about the lives of the unemployed in northern England during the early twentieth century. Orwell also gives a lot of attention to the typical life of a coal miner and his family. He discusses the long hours and horrible conditions that these men face everyday they go to work. He even goes as far as to go down into a coal mine himself to get the experience first hand. In the later part of the book Orwell shifts his focus to the things he found wrong with the Socialists. He touches on the impact Socialists have on each class and how they make it impossible to get out of whatever class you were born into. George Orwell was a journalist and a writer in the early twentieth century. Orwell's goals were to give an accurate description of the life of the working class in Wigan. He also goes on to give his opinion on the rule of Socialists in northern England. The Road to Wigan Pier was written in 1937, but was only published in England at that time. The events and the time period being discussed were current and up to date. Orwell wrote his book as a first-hand experience that could be used as a reliable reference about the working/unemployed class in Wigan. Orwell did not talk to miners to find out what they daily routine was; he experienced it for himself. He was living in the society and was going through the same struggles everyone had to face. In the chapters Orwell goes into detail about the lives of the coal miners I had mixed feeling about his view. At the beginning I thought that he was just taking pieces of facts and pieces of his opinion and combining the two to give a half-accurate report. As I continued to read and saw that he himself went down in to a mine and experienced the work and conditions they actually face, my feelings changed. For him to endure the pain of walking miles hunched over down the mine to the coal face and then breathing the "black air" just to understand what these men go through ...
Thursday, November 21, 2019
Sexual attractions in the client - therapist relationship - Psychology - Essay Example apist has an intrinsic responsibility to understand this and be able to handle it - which means finding his or her own sexual gratification elsewhereÃ¢â¬ ¦ It is far better to assert your own boundaries than to transgress those of the client. (par. 13) Three most important features describe the context in which the client-therapist relationship takes place: Ã¢â¬Å"there is an expectation of trustworthiness, an unequal power relationship exists and the interaction occurs under condition of privacyÃ¢â¬ (Feldman-Summers, 1989, cited in Hall, 2001, p. 512). First, trust is expected, because it is this trust that makes the therapist-client relationship possible. Trust on the part of the client is what makes him/her divulge even the deepest secrets in his/her life/self believing that his/her therapist would bring him/her Ã¢â¬Å"towards a healthy mind and healthy lifeÃ¢â¬ (Borden, n.d., par. 14). On the other hand, trust on the part of the therapist is more to him/herself that he/she could fulfill his/her responsibility to his/her client. Second, the relationship between the client and the therapist could never be equal, as the client relies almost fully on the expertise of the therapist. In fact the therapistÃ¢â¬â¢s power over h is/her client basically comes from the following sources: (1) aesculapian power Ã¢â¬â Ã¢â¬Å" the power that the physician possesses by virtue of her training in the discipline and the art or craft of medicine;Ã¢â¬ (2) charismatic power Ã¢â¬â Ã¢â¬Å"the personality characteristics of the physician;Ã¢â¬ (3) Social power Ã¢â¬â Ã¢â¬Å"arises from the social status of the physicianÃ¢â¬ (Brody, 1992, cited in Hall, 2001, p. 513); and, (4) Ã¢â¬Å"hierarchical power, the power inherent by oneÃ¢â¬â¢s position in a medical hierarchyÃ¢â¬ (McMillan & Anderson, 1997, cited in Hall, 2001, p. 513). Thus, it is of vital importance that a Ã¢â¬Ëneutral, safe placeÃ¢â¬â¢ be established for the client to be fully free allowing a therapeutic alliance to grow (Simon, 1999, cited in Hall, 2001, p. 512). And third,